Managers’ Compensation in a Mixed Ownership Industry: Evidence from Nursing Homes by Sean Shenghsiu Huang et al.
December 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 2831
Original research
published: 26 December 2016
doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2016.00283
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org
Edited by: 
Mihajlo Jakovljevic, 
University of Kragujevac, Serbia; 
Hosei University Tokyo, Japan
Reviewed by: 
Allen C. Meadors, 
The Global Leadership Group, USA 
Georgi Iskrov, 
Plovdiv Medical University, Bulgaria  
Habib Nawaz Khan, 
University of Science and Technology, 
Pakistan
*Correspondence:
Dean G. Smith  
dgsmith@lsuhsc.edu
Specialty section: 
This article was submitted to Health 
Economics, 
a section of the journal 
Frontiers in Public Health
Received: 10 October 2016
Accepted: 09 December 2016
Published: 26 December 2016
Citation: 
Huang SS, Hirth RA and Smith DG 
(2016) Managers’ Compensation in a 
Mixed Ownership Industry: Evidence 
from Nursing Homes. 
Front. Public Health 4:283. 
doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2016.00283
Managers’ compensation in a Mixed 
Ownership industry: evidence from 
nursing homes
Sean Shenghsiu Huang1, Richard A. Hirth2 and Dean G. Smith3*
1 Department of Health Systems Administration, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, USA, 2 Department of Health 
Management and Policy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA, 3 Louisiana Health Sciences Center, School of Public 
Health, New Orleans, LA, USA
An extensive literature is devoted to differences between for-profit and non-profit 
health-care providers’ prices, utilization, and quality. Less is known about for-profit and 
non-profit managers’ compensation and its relationship with financial and quality per-
formance. The aim of this study is to examine whether for-profit and non-profit nursing 
homes place differential weights on financial and quality performance in determining 
managers’ compensation. Using a unique 8-year dataset on Ohio nursing homes, 
fixed-effect regression models of managers’ compensation include financial and quality 
performance as well as other explanatory variables concerning firm and market charac-
teristics and manager qualifications. Among for-profit nursing homes, compensation of 
owner-managers and non-owner managers are compared. Compensation of for-profit 
managers is significantly positively associated with profit margin and return-on-assets, 
while compensation of non-profit managers does not exhibit any consistent relationship 
with financial measures. Compensation of neither for-profit nor non-profit managers is 
significantly related to quality measures. Nursing home size and managers’ years of 
experience are the only consistent determinants of compensation. Owner-managers earn 
significantly higher compensation than non-owner managers and their compensation is 
less related to nursing home performance. Finding that home size and experience are 
strong determinants of compensation, and the association with ownership and financial 
performance for for-profit nursing homes are as expected. The insignificant relationship 
between compensation and quality performance is potentially troublesome.
Keywords: nursing homes, non-profit, ownership, compensation, quality, incentives
inTrODUcTiOn
There are long-standing debates about the role of non-profit and for-profit organizations in the 
health-care sector and changes in profit status (1, 2). For-profit organizations have a prominent 
presence in what is clearly a mixed ownership industry. Among non-government organizations, 
for-profits account for about 40% of U.S. hospitals (3) and 74% of U.S. nursing homes (4).
It is common to expect that all health-care providers are concerned with both financial perfor-
mance and quality of care. Hirth (5) posits that non-profit nursing homes maximize quality subject 
to non-distribution constraints, placing concerns about quality ahead of concerns about profits. To 
test predictions on differences between non-profits and for-profit health-care organizations, most 
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empirical studies have examined quality of care, charity care, 
and utilization of intensive care. Results are rather mixed. For 
example, Sloan et al. (6) find that non-profit hospitals have lower 
costs than non-profits, with no difference in the quality provided. 
Shen (7) finds that fewer adverse outcomes occur among acute 
myocardial infarction patients at non-profit hospitals. Norton 
and Staiger (8) find that ownership choices often interact with 
unobservable market-level characteristics. They also find that 
for-profit hospitals self-select into well-insured areas. Without 
controlling for such self-selection problems, estimates based on 
a direct comparison between non-profits and for-profits can be 
endogenous.
In this paper, we ask whether non-profit and for-profit 
nursing homes place different weights on financial and quality 
performance in deciding managers’ compensation. We suggest 
that managers might receive incentives that reflect the motives 
of their organizations. The idea is that if the non-profits truly 
pursue quality beyond its direct impact on financial performance, 
then quality of care should also be independently important in 
determining managers’ compensation. This idea is not completely 
novel, as compensation under different ownership structures has 
been previously explored. For example, Roomkin and Weisbrod 
(9) find that compensation for top executives is higher in for-
profit hospitals than in non-profits. They also examine the 
compensation composition between base salaries and bonuses 
and find that bonuses are absolutely and relatively greater in the 
for-profits. Ballou and Weisbrod (10) examine chief executive 
officers (CEOs) compensation structure and find that religious 
non-profits pay significantly higher base salaries and that secular 
non-profits are more likely to provide bonuses and incentive 
plans. Preyra and Pink (11) find that CEOs of non-profit hospitals 
earn significantly lower but much more stable compensation than 
their counterparts at publicly traded companies. Kramer and 
Santerre (12) find that non-profit hospital CEOs’ pay is driven by 
the occupancy rate and admission of privately insured patients.
A limitation of many previous studies is their use of either 
single-year data (9, 10), or U.S. Internal Revenue Service Form 
990 (13), or confine the scope of their study to only non-profit 
organizations (11, 14). Furthermore, prior studies have lacked 
information describing managers’ experience and educational 
background that may be useful in explaining differences in 
compensation that extend beyond financial and quality measures.
conceptual Framework and hypotheses
It is widely recognized that managers are employed by the board 
of directors/trustees to act as the representative agents for the 
shareholders (in the for-profit case) or the donors and communi-
ties (in the non-profit case). Under the standard principal-agent 
model, the board/trustee is the principal who contracts with the 
agent (the manager) to make optimal use of resources and to 
maximize the share holders’ welfare (15). Because managers’ effort 
is not perfectly observable and monitoring managers’ behavior is 
often costly, managers may actually maximize their own benefits 
instead of shareholders’ welfare. It is not feasible to contract 
managers’ every effort, leading boards to seek a second-best 
alternative: compensation for performance. Performance-based 
compensation ties at least part of the managers’ compensation to 
outcomes that are observable to the board. In a profit-maximizing 
private firm, managers’ compensation is often tied to financial 
performance. This can take the form of performance-based cash 
bonuses or stock options that supplement base salaries. In a mixed 
ownership industry, the contract between the principal and the 
agent becomes more complicated, as non-profits can have motives 
as important, or more important, than profit-maximization (e.g., 
quality of care).
Because this paper uses nursing home data in the empirical 
analysis, we discuss hypotheses in the context of the nursing 
home industry. For-profits and non-profits are the two major 
organizational forms in the nursing home industry. We suggest 
that one key task of for-profit nursing home managers is to 
maximize profits. Thus, if the firms connect managers’ compen-
sation to performance, managers’ compensation should be at 
least partially tied to nursing homes’ financial performance. The 
relationship between compensation and quality measures is less 
clear. Theoretically, quality performance only matters to for-profit 
nursing homes through its impact on financial performance. For 
example, good quality may attract patients who are willing to 
pay higher prices, and good reputation is an intangible asset that 
allows nursing homes to attract patients in the long term. It is 
possible that for-profit managers are indirectly rewarded for qual-
ity that improves profitability. Yet, managers in for-profits should 
be less likely rewarded for quality that is driven by non-financial 
motives.
We further suggest that non-profit organizations pursue some 
non-financial goals such as quality and community services. 
Under these circumstances, it is more difficult to tie optimal 
manager time and effort to each organizational goal. In the con-
text of the nursing home industry, non-profit nursing homes are 
usually thought to maximize and balance both profits and quality. 
Although there are no shareholders in the non-profit nursing 
homes, earning profits is still an important goal, as profits supply 
financial resources needed to provide services and quality care. 
What sets non-profits apart from for-profits is that better quality 
itself can be a direct and independent goal, even if quality already 
exceeds a profit-maximizing level. In the non-profit nursing 
homes, both financial and non-financial motives make quality as 
an important objective.
Hypothesis 1: Financial performance is expected have a 
stronger influence on for-profit managers’ compensation than that 
of non-profit managers. In turn, quality performance is expected to 
have a stronger influence on non-profit managers’ compensation 
than that of for-profit managers.
Owner-Managers
We further consider managers of for-profit nursing homes of 
being one of two types: those who have significant ownership 
(owner-managers) and those who do not (non-owner managers). 
A manager is considered as an owner-manager if the manager has 
at least a 5% ownership stake in the firm. Their incentives may 
differ from those of managers who do not have significant owner-
ship (16). To develop a specific hypothesis, we borrow concepts 
from two different schools of thought: the optimal contracting 
approach and the managerial power approach. The optimal 
contracting model suggests that, because owner-managers can 
FigUre 1 | sample of managers and exemptions.
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directly share a portion of the residual profits, the principal-
agent problem may be milder (17, 18). Using a dataset of small 
corporations, Ang et al. (19) find that agency costs are inversely 
related to managers’ ownership share. Since there is less need to 
use pay-for-performance to mitigate the agency problem, one 
may expect that owner-managers’ compensation would be tied 
less to their performance (20).
The managerial power approach provides another hypothesis 
about owner-managers’ compensation (21, 22). Because owner-
managers have more influence on corporate policies, they may be 
more likely to exercise their managerial power to collect private 
benefits, including their own compensation (23–27).
In addition, as compared to non-owner managers, owner- 
managers face higher risks from their equity stake. Owner-
managers can also exercise their managerial power to raise 
compensation to reflect the investment uncertainty. The hypoth-
esis about owner-managers can be synthesized as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Owner-managers are expected to earn higher 
compensation than non-owner managers, with owner-managers’ 
compensation being less strongly tied to their performance.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
We obtain a unique 8-year (2003–2010) dataset that provides 
detailed manager characteristics and compensation for all for-
profit and non-profit nursing home in Ohio. The managers are the 
nursing home administrators who are the main decision makers 
and are responsible for the operation of the nursing home. The 
Ohio Department of Job and Family Services collects an annual 
cost report from every nursing home that receives state Medicaid 
reimbursement. Because this dataset contains information for 
both for-profit and non-profit nursing homes, we are able to 
compare directly the compensation and its relationship with 
financial and quality performance between for-profit and non-
profit nursing homes.
These data include information on permanent managers (as 
opposed to interim managers), defined as managers who worked 
at least 200 days during each fiscal year under examination, result-
ing in 7,261 person-year observations. As depicted in Figure 1, 
several exemption criteria are employed to create a consistent set 
of comparisons. We exempted observations on extreme financial 
measures, defined as the top and bottom 1% values of compensa-
tion, assets, profit margins, and return on assets (ROA). We also 
exempted nursing homes changing their ownership, owned by 
a government entity, owned by a hospital and located within a 
hospital, resulting in an analytic sample with 6,071 observations.
The key dependent variable is annual compensation. 
Nominal values of compensation are adjusted to year 2003 
dollars using the consumer price index. Other manager 
characteristics that may explain compensation include college 
education, years of health-care-related work experience, and 
ownership. College education is a binary variable associated 
with having a bachelor’s degree. The particular major or minor 
are not included, nor is there any consideration of graduate 
degrees. Years of work experience are reported in continuous 
numbers and capped at 10 years in the data. Owner manage-
ment is defined as having more than a 5% equity stake in their 
nursing home’s equity.
Among many potential financial measures, we use both the 
profit margin and ROA as the primary proxies for financial 
performance. The profit margin is defined as net income 
divided by total revenues. The second financial measure, ROA, 
is defined as net income divided by total assets and has been 
widely used in prior research on managerial compensation 
(28, 29).
We use four common quality measures as proxies for 
managers’ performance on quality of care. These measures 
are the numbers and severity of health deficiencies identified 
by inspectors, prevalence of restraints, prevalence of pressure 
sores, and nurse hours per patient day. We extracted quality 
measures from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ 
Nursing Home Compare (NHC) website (https://www.
medicare.gov/nursinghomecompare/). The website includes 
comprehensive quality measures for all Medicare-certified 
nursing homes. Data about inspection deficiency measures are 
available starting with 2001, and other quality measures are 
available from 2003 to 2010. Every 9–15 months, state health 
personnel inspect all nursing homes and report any deficien-
cies and their severity. We weight each deficiency according to 
its severity (from 1 to 12) and create a Deficiency Score variable 
that aggregates all severity-weighted deficiencies; the higher 
the deficiency score, the lower the quality. High prevalence 
of restraint use and pressure sores in general represents low 
quality.
We also use Online Survey and Certification and Reporting 
and NHC datasets to provide several important control variables, 
including the number of beds, chain affiliation, payer-mix, aver-
age number of activities of daily living (ADLs), for-profit market 
share, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure of mar-
ket concentration, median household income, and the population 
(in 1,000) above 65 years old per square mile.
empirical specification
We use nursing home fixed-effect models in our analysis. The 
dependent variable is the managers’ annual compensation. The 
nursing home fixed-effect model can account for facility-level 
time-invariant variables that are not observable (e.g., corporate 
governance). The regression model is described as:
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where Yi,t represents the level of managers’ annualized compen-
sation. Performance includes the measures of the nursing home 
financial and quality performance. Firm is a vector of time-
varying nursing home characteristics including size (number of 
beds), chain affiliation, continuing care retirement communities 
(CCRC), occupancy rate, and the payer mix among Medicaid, 
Medicare, and private payers. We lag the performance and nurs-
ing home-level variables by 1 year, because managers’ compensa-
tion may be based on previous performance. Market represents 
the market level characteristics, such as for-profit market shares, 
HHI, and demographic variables (the density of the elderly popu-
lation) for market m in year t. We also include the count-level 
household median income to account for the difference in costs 
of livings, especially between rural and urban settings. We use 
county as the definition of the local market. Manager represents 
the manager-level characteristics, including a variable indicating 
whether the manager has a bachelor’s degree and a continuous 
variable of the managers’ years of work experience in a related 
field. Owner is one if the managers are also the owners. H repre-
sents a set of nursing home characteristics that are constant over 
time (e.g., for-profit status) and control for nursing home-fixed 
effects. T represents the year dummy variables that control for 
year-fixed effects and ε is the error term. Statistical analyses were 
performed using the STATA 14.1 (30).
resUlTs
Table 1 presents the means and SDs of the analytic sample. The 
CPI adjusted mean compensations are $70,278 and 67,096 for the 
for-profit and non-profit managers, respectively.
The average profit margins are 3.41 and 1.79% and the aver-
age ROAs are 13.75 and 0.58% for the for-profit and non-profit 
nursing homes, respectively. While profit margin and ROA are 
potentially closely related, the correlation coefficient between 
these two financial measures is only 0.118, permitting the inclu-
sion of both measures in multivariate analyses.
On average, for-profit nursing homes have lower quality than 
their non-profit counterparts. In for-profit nursing homes, about 
5.39% residents are physically restrained, 8.96% have pressure 
sores, and total nurses hours average 3.62/day. In non-profit nurs-
ing homes, only 3.82% of the residents are physically restrained, 
8.59% of the residents have pressure sores, and total nurse hours 
average 4.10/patient day. As with the financial measures, the 
quality measures are not highly correlated, and all measures are 
included in the regressions.
Many of the firm-level and market-level control variables 
exhibit similar values between the for-profit and non-profit nurs-
ing homes. Medicaid market share, ADLs, occupancy rates, num-
ber of beds, population (in 1,000) above 65 years old per square 
mile and HHI are similar between ownership types. For-profit 
nursing homes exhibit a lower percentage of private pay patients, 
are more likely to be part of a chain and less likely to be part of a 
CCRC. For-profit nursing homes are also more likely to be an area 
with a larger concentration of for-profit nursing homes.
Over 90% of managers hold a college degree with non-
profit managers being slightly likely than for-profit managers 
to hold a college degree. Non-profit managers also have more 
health-care-related work experience. Nearly one-fifth of the for-
profit managers have more than a 5% equity stake in their nursing 
homes equity and are considered the owners of the nursing 
facilities.
The regression results in Table 2 show that for-profit manag-
ers’ compensation is positively associated with better financial 
performance, but is not related to quality. On the other hand, 
we find no consistent relationship between non-profit managers’ 
compensation and either financial or quality performance.
Among the firm-level variables, occupancy rate, number of 
beds, and payer mix are the most influential variables. Consistent 
with prior studies [e.g., Ref. (10)], firm size is an important fac-
tor in determining the compensation. The different mix among 
Medicaid, Medicare, or private payers implies that the nursing 
homes have different patient-mix and therefore require manag-
ers to have differential skills and abilities. The coefficients of 
the private-pay and Medicaid-pay shares are both negative and 
significant (at least among for-profits), suggesting managers’ 
compensation is positively correlated with Medicare-pay shares. 
Particularly, Medicare covers post-acute care for 100 days, and 
residents engaging in this care often require more complicated 
services and special rehabilitations. The results suggest that 
managers of nursing homes with higher Medicare revenue share 
receive significantly higher compensation.
All else equal, the results in Table  2 indicate that owner- 
managers, on average, earn about $17,295 more than their 
non-owner peers. Having a college degree is not associated with 
a statistically significant pay differential. Experience matters with 
a 1 SD more of work experience (2.4 years) being associated with 
about 4.9% ($3,474) higher compensation.
We further split the for-profit nursing homes into two samples: 
administered by owner-managers and non-owner managers. 
We perform a sub-analysis to examine whether the relationship 
between compensation and performance differs between owner-
managers and non-owner managers. The results are presented in 
Table 3. We find that the compensation of both owner-managers 
and non-owner managers are not related to quality performance. 
In terms of financial performance, the compensation of non-
owner managers is significantly and consistently correlated with 
profit margin and ROA but, on the other hand, the compensation 
of owner-managers does not have consistent and significant rela-
tionship with profit margin and ROA. Overall, our results provide 
suggestive evidence that owner-managers earn higher compensa-
tion and it is less tied to both financial and quality performances.
DiscUssiOn
Overall, we find that in the nursing home industry, managers’ 
compensation reflects common financial measures among for-
profit homes, but the magnitude of the effect is relatively small. 
For a for-profit manager, a 1 SD increase in profit margin is asso-
ciated with $33.67 higher compensation and a 1 SD increase in 
ROA is associated with $129.83 higher compensation. The results 
are consistent with the literature (11, 31) suggesting that firms 
TaBle 1 | summary statistics.
For-profit non-profit
Mean sD Mean sD
compensation
Annual compensation (nominal) 78,105 30,838 74,220 27,177
Annual compensation (CPI adjusted) 70,278 27,318 67,096 23,959
Performance measures
Financial measures (%)
Return on assets 13.75 44.77 0.58 19.15
Profit margin 3.41 8.70 1.79 11.30
Quality measures (%)
Deficiency score 22.19 20.54 17.42 17.61
Prevalence of restraint 5.39 5.99 3.82 5.14
Prevalence of pressure sores 8.96 7.83 8.59 6.86
Nurse h/day 3.62 0.91 4.10 1.22
Firm characteristics
Private-pay share (t − 1) 0.21 0.12 0.30 0.16
Medicaid-pay share (t − 1) 0.67 0.15 0.58 0.18
Average activities of daily living (ADLs) (t − 1) 5.32 0.80 5.37 0.78
Chain 0.64 0.48 0.45 0.50
Occupancy rate (t − 1) 86.74 12.06 91.06 11.06
Number of beds (t − 1) 98.71 43.24 103.92 54.49
Continuing care retirement communities 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.36
Market characteristics
For-profit market share 0.89 0.19 0.41 0.33
000’ 65+ per square mile 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.13
Herfindahl–Hirschman index 0.40 0.30 0.40 0.28
Log (median income) 10.69 0.15 10.71 0.15
Manager characteristics
Bachelor degree 0.90 0.30 0.93 0.26
Years of work experience 8.76 2.39 9.23 1.87
Owner 0.18 0.38 NA NA
number of observations 5,027 1,044
Private-pay share, Medicaid-pay share, average ADLs, occupancy rate, and number of beds are 1 year lagged values (t − 1) and therefore have fewer observations.
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are more reluctant to use performance-based incentives when the 
managers are contracted over several tasks, especially when some 
of them are difficult to measure. In addition, it is possible that 
resident satisfaction and other dimensions of quality are used in 
evaluating managers’ performance, but they are not included in 
our analysis.
From the perspective of both organizational governance and 
regulatory overseers, the results of this study are both affirming 
and potentially concerning. Appropriate compensation of senior 
managers is a key function of governance. Observing that com-
pensation is closely related to years of experience and the size of 
the enterprise is just as one would expect in a well-functioning 
market for managers. The observation that education is either not 
related to compensation or negatively associated with compensa-
tion is somewhat surprising.
The first part of hypothesis 1 is confirmed that financial 
performance has a stronger influence on for-profit managers’ 
compensation than that of non-profit managers. The second 
part is not confirmed, as quality performance does not appear 
to have a stronger influence on non-profit managers’ compensa-
tion than on for-profit managers’ compensation. While some of 
the coefficients are in the hypothesized direction, all estimates 
are far from statistically significant and do not provide strong 
support for quality as an independent determinant of manager 
compensation.
The lack of significant relationships between non-profit man-
agers’ compensation and both financial and quality performance 
suggests that non-profit nursing homes may not reward or penal-
ize their managers based on performance. This is a potentially 
troublesome finding. Both organizationally and socially, provision 
of high quality nursing home services is very important. These 
data do not suggest that quality levels are so high that there is a 
ceiling effect that does not permit observation of the association 
between quality and compensation – the association simply does 
not present itself in these data. More refined attempts to establish 
this association are worthy of future attention.
Hypothesis 2 is confirmed that owner-managers earn higher 
compensation than non-owner managers and that owner-
managers’ compensation tied less strongly to their performance. 
Compensation of non-owner managers is significantly and 
consistently correlated with profit margin and ROA, but the 
compensation of owner-managers does not have consistent and 
significant relationship with profit margin and ROA.
With regard to the higher compensation paid to owner-
managers, the observation may simply be an accounting choice 
issue. That is to say, firms can choose to distribute earnings 
through higher salaries of managers or as dividends/profit distri-
butions. Setting aside tax implications, owners may be indifferent 
between these options and, on average, provide earnings through 
managers’ salaries. Given this choice of distributing some profits 
TaBle 3 | nh fixed-effect: performance and managers’ compensation ($) 
by owner and non-owner manager.
Owner-manager non-owner manager
(1) (2)
Performance
Profit margin (t − 1) −147.99* 2.80***
[80.779] [1.014]
ROA (t − 1) 28.24 4.50***
[22.653] [1.661]
Restraint (t − 1) −54.5 94.76
[315.173] [81.552]
Pressure sores (t − 1) 37.49 −5.15
[252.709] [70.770]
Deficiencies (t − 1) −24.28 −0.31
[63.417] [20.135]
Nurse h/day (t − 1) 328.24 −41.21
[1,802.517] [536.768]
Firm characteristics
Chain (t − 1) −3,628.71 512.09
[4,822.441] [1,471.581]
Occupancy rate (t − 1) 360.61** 76.1
[149.671] [46.921]
Number of beds (t − 1) 324.45** 120.04**
[135.165] [54.090]
Private-pay share (t − 1) −9,943.21 −10,675.86*
[22,441.546] [6,454.507]
Medicaid-pay share (t − 1) −13,972.39 −8,558.53
[18,823.761] [6,469.306]
Avg. # of activities of daily  
living (t − 1)
−1,911.47
[2,492.039]
−1,165.66*
[629.276]
Manager characteristics
Bachelor degree −15,014.35 −4,648.48**
[12,435.582] [1,993.941]
Experience (years) 4,238.11*** 1,462.97***
[1,533.276] [230.949]
R-squared 0.23 0.37
Observation 868 4,156
The sample is limited to for-profit nursing homes.
(1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) The SE is clustered at the county level.
(3) All regressions control for the year-fixed effects, county level income, Herfindahl–
Hirschman Index, for-profit market share, percentage of population above 65 years old, 
and whether or not the facility is part of the continuing care retirement communities.
TaBle 2 | nh fixed-effect: performance and managers’ compensation ($).
all For-profit non-profit
(1) (2) (3)
Performance
Profit margin (t − 1) 2.91** 3.87*** −33.07***
[1.359] [0.659] [12.629]
ROA (t − 1) 2.96** 2.90** 21.04
[1.379] [1.394] [16.781]
Restraint (t − 1) 70.66 92.76 −91.1
[58.982] [65.309] [134.371]
Pressure sores (t − 1) 14.53 6 41.47
[50.416] [57.067] [88.511]
Deficiencies (t − 1) −1.26 0.2 −7.37
[14.117] [15.457] [28.171]
Nurse h/day (t − 1) −193.93 −404.4 167.21
[309.421] [414.884] [355.446]
Firm characteristics
Chain (t − 1) 116.56 635.93 −3,395.72
[1,138.520] [1,252.867] [2,249.454]
Occupancy rate (t − 1) 95.73*** 110.90*** −68.17
[34.050] [37.011] [76.668]
Number of beds (t − 1) 98.25** 88.18** 141.88*
[40.089] [43.674] [78.543]
Private-pay share (t − 1) −2,688.23 −2,359.93 3,381.55
[4,653.277] [4,756.397] [13,018.511]
Medicaid-pay share (t − 1) −5,175.33 −4,357.44 −3,825.85
[4,518.687] [4,707.430] [11,770.660]
Avg. # of activities of daily living 
(t − 1)
−183.49
[456.755]
−329.4
[480.068]
1,057.54
[1,344.722]
Manager characteristics
Owner 17,295.24*** 17,369.93***
[3,253.059] [3,223.253]
Bachelor degree −3,391.87 −3,778.66 −394.31
[2,401.295] [2,848.117] [2,179.143]
Experience (years) 1,447.64*** 1,473.50*** 1,208.66***
[211.830] [232.309] [320.088]
R-squared 0.29 0.29 0.35
Observation 6,022 5,020 1,002
(1) ***, **, and * represent significance at 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.
(2) We use robust SE for nursing home fixed-effect models.
(3) All regressions control for the year-fixed effects, county level income, percentage of 
population above 65 years old, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, and whether or not the 
facility is part of the continuing care retirement communities.
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through salaries, reported profits among owner-managed firms 
may be lower than would otherwise be the case.
Including profits as a determinant of compensation is com-
mon practice among many firms. Among non-profits, measures 
of budget adherence, rather than profits, is quite common. Again, 
the finding of a negative relationship between compensation and 
profit margin for owner managers may be explained by the choice 
of profit distribution.
limitations
There are several limitations to the conclusions of this study. First, 
we do not have data on managers’ tenure, turnover, and other 
personal characteristics that could potentially be significant, and 
their absence can cause omitted variable biases. Compensation 
might be positively correlated with tenure in the same firm. If 
non-profit managers were to stay in the same organization for 
a longer period than for-profit managers, the compensation 
comparison between for-profit and non-profit could be biased. 
It is possible that performance is reflected in managers’ turnover 
but not in their compensation. Furthermore, there are a host of 
other personal characteristics, such as age and gender that may 
be related to compensation but are not captured in available data.
Second, the compensation information does not separate 
the base salaries and stock or other bonus. For privately held 
nursing homes, without the market value of the stock bonus, 
the actual compensation that includes stock bonus can be 
potentially higher than reflected in the data. It is also possible 
that performance is tied to the composition of compensation 
and not the overall level of the compensation. Although Cole 
and Mehran (32) point out that only very few privately held 
small firm issue stock options, there are nursing homes belong-
ing to national chains and their managers might be more likely 
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to receive stock bonus. Unfortunately, such detailed chain 
information is not available in our data. While we include the 
chain affiliation as an independent variable, we are not able to 
identify the large and publicly listed chains. Managers at the 
publicly listed and privately held chains may receive different 
compensation.
Third, while the current reports are assumed to be consist-
ent among for-profit and non-profit organizations, ownership 
type may influence reporting practices. There is evidence that 
for-profit hospitals report some financial data more aggressively 
than non-profit hospitals (33), and the same may be true for this 
sample of nursing homes.
Finally, because our analysis relies on Ohio nursing homes 
only, the results may not be generalized to other states or other 
nations, where may have very different policy regulations and 
market structures.
cOnclUsiOn
The primary goal of this paper is to use a novel dataset of manag-
ers’ compensation to empirically examine whether for-profit and 
non-profit organizations place different emphasis on financial 
and quality motives. We find that better financial performance 
is associated with slightly higher compensation among for-profit 
managers. Our results provide supportive evidence that for-profit 
managers are contracted and rewarded differentially from those 
working for the non-profits. The lack of significant relationship 
between compensation and quality metrics at both for-profit and 
non-profit nursing homes is potentially troublesome. However, 
the results should be interpreted with caution due to data limita-
tions. Furthermore, the evaluation and monitoring of quality 
performance at the facility level may be too costly to the board 
because quality is multi-dimensional, many health outcomes 
often depend on the health status of patients when admitted, and 
the documentation and evaluation of every quality metric might 
just not always be feasible. These factors and others may prevent 
managers’ compensation from reflecting short-term quality 
performance.
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